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Abstract 
 
A common phenomenon in entrepreneurship is that employees turn away from employment 
to found their own businesses. Prior literature discusses the former employers’ 
characteristics that influence the creation of entrepreneurial ventures. An investigation of 
whether these characteristics also affect the success of the spawned ventures is missing so far. 
This paper contributes to the literature by showing that entrepreneurial ventures spawned by 
well performing firms are financially more successful than ventures stemming from bad 
performing firms. This suggests that spawned entrepreneurs are able to exploit valuable 
knowledge from their previous employers which impacts their ventures’ performance 
positively. The analysis is based on a linked employee-employer dataset for the Netherlands 
for the period 1999-2004. 
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1. Introduction 
The public image of entrepreneurship is shaped by talented individuals who lack 
education and work experience but still manage to found highly successful and world-
renowned companies (Chatterij, 2009). Famous examples include Bill Gates, Steve Jobs and 
Sir Richard Branson who have all become self-made billionaires (Miller and Kroll, 2010). 
The more realistic view on entrepreneurship, however, is that entrepreneurs display 
significant employment histories (Cooper, 1985; Chandler, 1996). In fact, several academic 
studies argue that many entrepreneurs make use of business ideas that have been encountered 
through previous employment (Klepper, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and Sleeper, 
2005; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008).
1
  
Accordingly, existing firms seem to be an important driving force of entrepreneurship 
as many new ventures are bred by their founders’ previous employers. This process, by which 
former employees create new, independent ventures, is referred to as “entrepreneurial 
spawning”. Although entrepreneurial spawning appears to be a rather common and 
acknowledged phenomenon (Gompers et al., 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Garvin, 1983; 
Cooper, 1985), only a few studies analyze the characteristics of firms that spawn 
entrepreneurial ventures (Gompers et al., 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Elfenbein et 
al., 2010). Rather prominent themes within these studies deal with the impact of firm size and 
performance on the rate at which new ventures are spawned (Gompers et al., 2005; Hyytinen 
and Maliranta, 2008; Franco and Filson, 2006; Elfenbein et al., 2010). Especially large firms 
are often argued to have high spawning rates. An explanation could be that employees start 
new ventures because they become frustrated that the entrepreneurial opportunities they 
identify are constantly rejected by their employers (Gompers et al., 2005). Small firms, in 
contrast, are assumed to equip their employees with the necessary skills for founding new 
                                                 
1
 This view has been confirmed in interviews with 100 founders of fast growing companies (Bhidé, 1994). 71% 
of these founders admitted that they took advantage of a business idea they had come across at their previous 
employer. 
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ventures which is reflected in increased spawning rates (Elfenbein et al., 2010). Regarding 
firm performance, two opposing views can be brought forward as well. Whereas less 
successful firms could spawn more new ventures because the opportunity costs for employees 
to stay at the firm are low, well performing firms might have high spawning rates as 
employees become exposed to more entrepreneurial opportunities (Gompers et al., 2005).  
A shortcoming in the current literature on entrepreneurial spawning, however, is that the 
link between the characteristics of the spawning firms (the former employers) and the success 
of the newly spawned ventures is insufficiently discussed (Gompers et al., 2005; Cassiman 
and Ueda, 2006; Klepper and Thompson, 2010). Of particular interest is the question whether 
successful firms also spawn successful ventures. It can be assumed that better performing 
firms provide an excellent learning environment for their employees, resulting in the creation 
of more successful ventures (Klepper, 2007; Boschma and Wenting, 2007). In this paper, we 
address this gap in the entrepreneurship literature and scrutinize if a positive relationship 
between venture performance and spawning firm performance exists.  
Our empirical analysis is based on the official employee-employer data sets of Statistics 
Netherlands for the years 1999-2005. As a first step of our analysis, we explore the effect of 
firm size and performance on the rate at which new ventures are spawned. Our results for the 
Netherlands largely confirm the findings by a previous study for the U.S. (Gompers et al., 
2005) as we show that large firms are the most active spawners. Furthermore, financially 
successful firms are found to spawn fewer ventures than unsuccessful firms. In the second 
step, we investigate if the spawning firms’ characteristics have an effect on the ventures’ 
performance. We find that being spawned by successful firms has a positive impact on the 
financial performance of the new ventures. This suggests that venture founders who worked at 
well performing firms have gathered more valuable knowledge about founding and running 
new businesses successfully than founders previously employed by less successful companies.  
 4
Our analysis contributes to the literature on entrepreneurial spawning in the following 
ways: to our knowledge, we are the first to study the effect of the spawning firms’ 
characteristics on the ventures’ financial performance.
2
 Second, our dataset encompasses a 
broad variety of spawning firms and newly spawned ventures. This means that our data is 
neither restricted to publicly listed spawning firms nor to newly spawned ventures that are 
venture capital backed (cf. Gompers et al., 2005). The dataset further covers entrepreneurial 
spawning in all manufacturing and service industries so that our study is not limited to one 
specific industry sector as in Agarwal et al. (2004) or Klepper and Sleeper (2005). 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, the existing 
literature on entrepreneurial spawning is reviewed. Afterwards, we describe our dataset and 
present the econometric results. The final section concludes.  
2. Theory and Research Questions 
Since entrepreneurial spawning has received increasing attention in the academic literature, 
scholars became interested in the characteristics of firms that breed new ventures. Two 
recurring characteristics within most studies are firm size and firm performance (Gompers et 
al., 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Elfenbein et al., 2010). Up until now, however, the 
empirical findings vary across different industry sectors and countries. Whereas some studies 
observe a negative relationship between firm size and spawning rate (Hyytinen and Maliranta, 
2008; Elfenbein et al., 2010), Gompers et al. (2005) report a positive relationship. Ambiguous 
findings also exist for the implications of performance on the rate at which new ventures are 
spawned. Gompers et al. (2005) discover that less successful firms spawn more ventures 
whereas Franco and Filson (2006) find no significant result. Previous literature provides 
theoretical arguments for these different empirical results. 
                                                 
2
 There are only two previous studies investigating the link between venture performance and the characteristics 
of the spawning companies (Franco and Filson, 2006; Erikkson and Kuhn 2006). Both studies, however, employ 
a survival based performance measure, while we focus on the ventures’ financial performance.  
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Large and bureaucratic firms are often argued to feature high spawning rates for a 
variety of reasons. Gompers et al. (2005) summarize these reasons and refer to them as the 
“Xerox view”
3
 of entrepreneurial spawning. First of all, unlike industry entrants, incumbent 
companies may be unable to adapt to radical technological change because their existing 
capabilities and routines are too inflexible (Tripsas and Gavetti, 2000; Sull, 1999; Tushman 
and Anderson, 1986). Henderson (1993) shows in her study on the photolithographic industry 
that incumbent firms are less productive than industry entrants at introducing radical 
technologies because of their outdated organizational capabilities. Such circumstances can 
induce creative and entrepreneurial employees to leave the firm and start their own ventures, 
where they can freely implement new ideas. A second reason for high spawning rates within 
large companies is that managers are incapable of evaluating and implementing 
entrepreneurial opportunities - as identified by employees - that are not within the firms’ core 
lines of business (Gompers et al., 2005; Klepper and Sleeper, 2005). Because managers lack 
the knowledge to make an informed decision about an unrelated entrepreneurial opportunity, 
they tend to dismiss it. Similarly, established companies could make a deliberate choice to 
leave out on entrepreneurial opportunities which are not in line with their core competencies. 
In this case, the decision to neglect employees’ entrepreneurial opportunities is not driven by 
organizational inefficiencies but by the conviction that remaining a focused firm is more value 
enhancing than being a diversified firm (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Accordingly, incumbents 
can act quite rigidly as they purposely forego profitable entrepreneurial opportunities for 
reasons of strategic commitment (Hellmann, 2007). All arguments of the Xerox view suggest 
that employees start new ventures because they are frustrated that the entrepreneurial 
opportunities they identified are not capitalized on by their employers (Gompers et al., 2005; 
Hellmann, 2007; Garvin, 1983; Klepper, 2001). 
                                                 
3
 Gompers et al. (2005) term this view the Xerox view because Xerox is exemplary for a large, incumbent firm 
that had to deal with the departure of several employees, who founded their own ventures.  
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But not only large firms are considered as potential incubators for entrepreneurial 
ventures. Some studies report a negative relationship between firm size and spawning rate 
(Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Elfenbein et al., 2010; Sørensen, 2007). Small firms can be active 
spawners because employees benefit from essential information on how to found new 
businesses. Relative to employees of large firms employees of small firms are granted 
superior access to valuable outside networks with customers and suppliers (Elfenbein et al., 
2010; Wagner, 2004; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006). Such network ties can be particularly useful 
when starting entrepreneurial ventures. Employees of small firms are also not bound to 
specialize on a single task. Instead, they can develop skills in a vast range of business related 
activities (Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Elfenbein et al., 2010, Cooper, 1985). Lazear (2004, 
2005) argues that successful entrepreneurs need to be “jacks-of-all-trades” and possess a 
balanced set of skills. Hence, small firms seem to provide the perfect organizational 
environment for employees to develop such sets of diversified skills, leading to higher rates of 
entrepreneurial spawning (cf. Sørensen, 2007; Elfenbein et al., 2010). The reasons presented 
above suggest that small firms shape their employees and provide them with the necessary 
skills, knowledge and contacts that could drive them into entrepreneurship eventually 
(Elfenbein et al., 2010).  
It is also possible though that small firms breed new ventures because risk seeking 
individuals tend to self-select into such firms (Gompers et al., 2005; Sørensen, 2007). 
Working for smaller firms is risky since, compared to large firms, wages are more variable 
(Parker, 2006; Elfenbein et al., 2010) and the likelihood of firm exits in the first years is high 
(Wagner, 1994). There is evidence that less risk averse people start working in small 
companies and do not hesitate to turn to entrepreneurship once they spot a valuable business 
opportunity (Elfenbein et al., 2010). Accordingly, individuals preferring to work for small 
firms might be those with a preference for becoming self-employed all along. A final reason 
is related to the salaries paid in small firms. Usually, employees in small firms receive lower 
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salaries than individuals working for larger companies (see Elfenbein et al., 2010, and the 
references therein). Consequently, the opportunity costs for leaving the employer and 
founding a new venture are significantly lower. 
 Based on these two perspectives it becomes obvious that the theoretical literature as 
well as the empirical evidence lack a clear standpoint whether a positive or negative 
relationship between size and spawning rate exists. On the one hand, employees of large firms 
could start new ventures because they are frustrated that the entrepreneurial opportunities they 
would like to pursue are hardly implemented by their employers. On the other hand, 
employees of small firms could become entrepreneurs because they have gathered the 
necessary know-how from their previous employers. Hence, the following research question 
arises: 
 
RQ1: What effect does firm size have on the rate at which new ventures are spawned? 
 
In a similar vein, the theoretical arguments for the relationship between employer 
performance and spawning rate are ambiguous. Irrespective of the employer’s size, the 
employee’s opportunity costs for starting a new venture are also low if the performance of the 
employer is weak. Most empirical studies confirm that employees who work at an 
unsuccessful firm turn to entrepreneurship because the rents from remaining employed are 
small (Gompers et al., 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008). Eriksson and Kuhn (2006) 
characterize ventures emerging from unsuccessful firms to be “pushed” as they are a reaction 
to unfavorable conditions at the spawning firms.  
Alternatively, a firm could spawn more entrepreneurial ventures if its performance is 
high. This argument is based on the fact that employees working at a financially viable firm 
are assumed to be exposed to more entrepreneurial opportunities (Gompers et al., 2005; 
Franco and Filson, 2006), which they could pursue as self-employed individuals. Such 
 8
ventures are “pulled” by the market as employees would only leave a profitable firm if the 
returns from the perceived entrepreneurial opportunity are high enough (Eriksson and Kuhn, 
2006). 
 Since existing research suggests that the relationship between firm performance and 
spawning rate could either be positive or negative, the second research question reads as 
follows:  
 
RQ2: What effect does firm performance have on the rate at which new ventures are 
spawned? 
 
As previous literature mainly focuses on the determinants of entrepreneurial spawning, 
Gompers et al. (2005) suggest examining whether the spawning firms’ characteristics can 
affect the success of the new ventures. In particular, they probe the question if ventures of 
successful spawning companies turn out to be successful as well. This positive relationship 
could be based on the quality of knowledge that founders of newly spawned ventures have 
learnt from their previous employers. Previous research has shown that nascent entrepreneurs 
can acquire useful knowledge about technologies (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Agarwal et al., 
2004), markets (Jovanovic, 1982; Agarwal et al., 2004) and organizational processes 
(Buenstorf, 2009) during their employment phases. Since successful companies have 
accumulated a rich knowledge base (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Klepper, 2001), it can be 
assumed that ventures originating from such firms have superior initial knowledge 
endowments as compared to ventures of less successful spawning companies. In other words, 
depending on their origin, some ventures have a knowledge advantage at birth, which can 
have long lasting effects on their performance (Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterij, 2009; Klepper 
and Sleeper, 2005; Stinchcombe, 1965). This implies that ventures which have been spawned 
by successful companies are likely to be successful themselves (cf. Klepper and Thompson, 
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2006; Klepper, 2001; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006). In addition to the learning argument, 
ventures spawned by successful firms turn out to be successful because, as was described 
before, employees are only tempted to become entrepreneurs if the perceived entrepreneurial 
opportunity is of high quality and promises high returns (Erikkson and Kuhn, 2006).  
So far, the only empirical evidence on the relationship between the performance of former 
employers and spawned ventures is provided by Franco and Filson (2006) and Erikkson and 
Kuhn (2006). Using data from the disk drive industry, Franco and Filson (2006) conclude that 
ventures of successful spawning companies turn out to be successful as well. Instead of using 
financial measures, however, they rely on the ventures’ life span to approximate performance. 
Erikkson and Kuhn (2006) conduct a similar analysis and find that ventures of firms which 
stopped their operations have lower survival probabilities than ventures of “healthy” firms. A 
drawback of survival measures is that they assume a strong correlation between economic 
performance and survival. Gimeno et al. (1997) argue, however, that performance is not the 
sole determinant of survival. Firms’ own performance thresholds matter as well, which 
explains why only some underperforming firms cease to exist while others survive. All 
previous studies dealing with the relationship between venture performance and spawning 
firm performance are subject to this limitation (Franco and Filson, 2006; Erikkson and Kuhn, 
2006). This paper circumvents this limitation by employing financial performance measures 
to analyze if there is a positive relationship between spawning firm success and venture 
success. Therefore, the final research question reads as follows: 
 
RQ3:  Is there a positive relationship between the financial performance of the 
spawning firm and the financial performance of the venture? 
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3. Data 
The empirical analysis relies on data sets provided by Statistics Netherlands (Centraal 
Bureau voor de Statistiek). Statistics Netherlands offers a rich set of information as it stores a 
variety of administrative registers, like employment statistics, self-employment statistics, 
financial statements for large and small firms and detailed firm level information (including 
firm location and firm age) for all firms in the Netherlands. All of these datasets contain 
unique employer and employee identifiers so that they can be linked to each other.  
In order to answer our three research questions we construct two datasets. By means of 
the first database, we investigate the firm attributes affecting spawning rates. Hence, this 
database constitutes a sample of spawning firms and a control group of non-spawning firms. 
The second database is required to analyze if the ventures’ performance is influenced by the 
characteristics of their spawning firms. The unit of analysis is therefore the spawned venture. 
The next two subsections describe in detail how both databases were compiled.  
3.1 Database 1: The Spawner Dataset 
Statistics Netherlands keeps track of the whole working population of the Netherlands. 
They not only observe individuals who are employed at companies but also hold information 
on self-employed individuals. The unit of observation in both data sources is the individual 
who can be linked to the company for which she works or, in case of self-employment, the 
venture she owns. Merging both datasets allows us to identify individuals who have been 
employed and then left their employers to start spawned ventures.
4
 By means of this 
information on the level of the individual, we identify the aggregate number of ventures a 
                                                 
4
 We allow for a gap of one year between employment and self-employment. This accounts for the fact that the 
transition process from employment to self-employment is not always smooth. It seems improbable that an 
employee quits her job in one month and has her own venture in the same or the following month already. 
Furthermore, our database only contains of first time entrepreneurs. Serial entrepreneurs have been eliminated, 
which is consistent with Gompers et al. (2005). 
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particular employer has spawned per year.
5
 We can then relate these annual spawning levels 
to a set of detailed firm level characteristics from the General Business Register and the 
financial statements provided by Statistics Netherlands.  
We restrict our sample to spawning firms from manufacturing and service industries. 
Furthermore, we exclude firms from the construction sector as this industry displays an 
unusually high rate of newly spawned ventures. A likely explanation is that the Dutch 
construction sector is characterized by “bogus self-employment”, which means that 
contractors disguise their workers’ employment status as self-employed (Vandenheuvel and 
Wooden, 1997). The contractors benefit financially from this as they become exempted from 
paying national insurance contributions for their workers.  
In total, we identify 19,895 spawning firms that have spawned 26,010 ventures during 
the period 1999 to 2004.
6
 Since we want to scrutinize if certain firm characteristics (firm size 
and performance, in particular) increase the rates at which new ventures are spawned and the 
likelihood of spawning at the firm level, we drew a random sample of non-spawning firms.
7
 
This control group of non-spawning companies contains of 28,320 firms. In total, the dataset 
contains of 122,272 firm year observations of Dutch manufacturing and service firms. 43% 
(52,597) of these observations are spawning firms in the sense that they have spawned at least 
one venture in the period from 1999-2004.  
The following subsections describe the variables that are used for the empirical analysis 
and provide descriptive statistics for spawners and non-spawners. 
                                                 
5
 We define a spawning company as the last employer an entrepreneur has worked for although she could have 
had multiple previous jobs. This definition is also consistent with Gompers et al. (2005). 
6
We can only analyze spawning rates in this time frame since the self-employment statistics and the employment 
statistics are unavailable before 1999. 
7
 Firms in the control group did not engage in entrepreneurial spawning during the whole period of interest. 
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3.1.1 Variables: The Spawner Dataset 
As indicated above, the dependent variable of our analysis is the annual number of 
ventures that an employer has spawned (Spawning Rate).  
Our main independent variables are size and performance of spawners and, given our 
control group, non-spawners. As in Gompers et al. (2005), our measure of firm size is total 
assets.
8
 Since the asset distribution is skewed across firms, we employ the logarithm of total 
assets (Size). Firm performance is measured by both annual growth in sales (Sales Growth) 
and return on assets (ROA). The latter performance variable is calculated as net income over 
total assets.  
In addition, we use a number of control variables: we include the companies’ total wage 
bill in our regression models. As it can be assumed that the “quality” of human capital is 
positively related to wage, we use this variable as a proxy for the skill composition of the 
spawning firms’ labor force (Griliches, 1969; Devine, 1994; Arnold and Hussinger, 2005). 
Since the total wage bill of a firm is typically highly correlated with its size, we normalize this 
variable by our firm size measure. This variable is labeled Average Wage in the remainder of 
the paper. Furthermore, some firms decide to remain undiversified regarding their business 
activities and refuse exploring unrelated business opportunities. As a result, entrepreneurial 
employees may decide to leave the firm and start their own ventures. To control for this, we 
introduce a dummy variable that takes the value one for firms that are active in only one 
industry segment and zero otherwise (Focused).  
We also account for the age of spawners and non-spawners in our regression models 
(Age). Since several studies have reported that especially young firms have a tendency to 
spawn new ventures (Gompers et al., 2005; Dobrev and Barnett, 2005; Wagner, 2004), we 
add a dummy variable that equals one if a spawning firm is five years old or younger and zero 
                                                 
8
 Note that employment as an alternative measure was not available to us since the datasets only provide firm 
size classes. 
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otherwise (Young). Firm age is censored at 37 years in our database. The reason is that 
Statistics Netherlands only started its data collection process in 1967. Firms that already 
existed before this year are treated as if they were founded in 1967. To account for this data 
limitation in our empirical specifications, we create a dummy variable, which takes the value 
one if a firm is 37 years of age - according to the Statistics Netherlands information - and zero 
otherwise (Old).  
Several studies find that certain regions are more likely to prompt entrepreneurship 
(Venkataraman, 2004; Audretsch, 2005, 2007a, 2007b; Malecki, 1994). This result is 
attributed to the fact that entrepreneurship capital, which forms the capacity for 
entrepreneurial activity, differs within regions. Entrepreneurship capital refers to a broad 
spectrum of legal, institutional and social factors (Audretsch, 2007a). In order to account for 
the fact that different regions might have different levels of entrepreneurial capital, we add 12 
region dummies corresponding to the 12 officially recognized regions that exist in the 
Netherlands (see Table 7 in the Appendix B). Finally, we create 34 industry dummies (see 
Table 8 in the Appendix B)
9
 and include 6 year dummies that control for business cycle 
effects.  
3.1.2 Descriptive Statistics: The Spawner Dataset 
Table 1 shows descriptive statistics for our sample of spawning firms and the control 
group of non-spawning firms. All financial variables are measured in thousands of Euros.  
The descriptive statistics reveal that, on average, a spawning firm breeds roughly 2.21 
ventures over the analyzed period of 6 years. This corresponds to an average of 0.39 spawned 
ventures per year. Comparing spawners with non-spawners shows that the former are, on 
average, almost four years older than the latter. Spawning firms are also much larger than 
non-spawning firms. This is reflected in the significantly higher average asset level. However, 
                                                 
9
 As can be seen from Table 8 in Appendix B, our industry classification is based on the 2-digit NACE industry 
level. 
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non-spawning firms significantly outperform spawning firms in terms of ROA. There is no 
significant difference regarding the sales growth of spawning and non-spawning firms. 
Finally, spawning companies pay significantly higher average wages than non-spawning 
companies and are also less likely to be diversified.  
 
-----------------insert Table 1 about here----------------- 
3.2 Database 2: The Venture Dataset 
Creating a database that allows us to scrutinize if venture performance is affected by the 
characteristics of their spawning companies involves three steps. First, we need to link 
financial information to our identified set of spawned ventures. Statistics Netherlands 
provides financial information for a stratified sample of firms which are obliged to pay 
corporate taxes. About 80% of the total population of these firms is sampled by Statistics 
Netherlands. Since most of the spawned ventures are one-person businesses and exempted 
from corporate taxation, financial information is not available for them.
10
 As a result, our 
sample contains 438 ventures that are subject to corporate taxes. The 438 ventures correspond 
to 637 venture-year observations, which define our final venture sample.  
In a second step, non-financial information is linked to these ventures. By means of this 
information, we are able to assess the ventures’ age as well as their regional and industry 
affiliations. The final step is to link our subset of ventures back to their spawning companies. 
This reveals that the 438 ventures have been spawned by 413 firms during the period 2000-
2005.
11
 Since our ventures stem from spawning firms in manufacturing or services, most 
                                                 
10
 Examples of such ventures that are not subject to corporate taxation are one-man consulting businesses and 
independent sales agents. 
11
 The timeframe of the analysis for the spawner database is the period 1999-2004. We loose the year 2005 since 
we allow for a one year gap when defining our spawned ventures. For the venture database, we focus on the 
period 2000-2005. We lose the first year for this dataset as it is not possible to observe the previous employment 
situation of entrepreneurs who founded new ventures in 1999. 
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ventures start operating in these sectors as well. Only 10% become active in non-
manufacturing or non-service industries.
12
 
In the next subsection, the variables that are used for the empirical analysis are 
described.  
3.2.1 Variables: The Venture Dataset 
We examine the ventures’ performance by considering two different performance 
measures. The first one is the ventures’ returns on assets (V_ROA). This measure has been 
frequently used in studies on the performance of young and small ventures (e.g. Murphy, 
1996; Robinson, 1999). Since ROA could be influenced by differences in capital structure or 
dividend policies across firms, we also use operating returns on assets (V_OROA) as a second 
performance measure. OROA is calculated as the ratio of earnings before interest and taxes 
(EBIT) to total assets and is a widely accepted performance measure (cf. Bennedsen, 2007 
and Hvide, 2010). The fact that our sample is highly unbalanced (most of the ventures are 
only observed once) does not allow us to use growth measures as dependent variables since 
we would lose most of our observations.
13
  
The same firm characteristics that have been used for our spawning companies are also 
used for the ventures. We control for the size of the ventures by taking the logarithm of total 
assets (V_Size). The quality of the ventures’ labor force is accounted for by the average wage 
(V_Average Wage). We also control for the age of the ventures (V_Age). Since some ventures 
are founded by more than one entrepreneur, we incorporate a dummy variable that takes the 
value one if ventures have been established by founding teams and zero otherwise (Founding 
                                                 
12
 An alternative set up would be to compare spawned ventures with a control group of ventures that have been 
established by entrepreneurs without any employment histories. Given our short observation period of five years, 
we decided to not follow this approach as we cannot determine whether the founders of the ventures within our 
potential control group have not been employed by a company prior to the designated time period.  
13
 Note that our 5-years sample does not allow us to conduct a meaningful survival analysis. Only 16 ventures 
exit in the period 2000-2005. 
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Team).
14
 Furthermore, ventures that are active in the same industry as their spawning 
companies might be more successful than others as they are more familiar with the industry 
conditions. To control for this possibility, we add a dummy variable that takes the value one if 
ventures and spawners are in the same industry and zero otherwise (Same Industry). Lastly, 
we include six industry and four region dummies for both spawned ventures and spawning 
companies.
15
  
Besides these venture characteristics, the dataset allows us to control for the attributes of 
the spawning firms. These spawning firm attributes have been described in section 3.1.1. The 
performance of spawning companies – measured by ROA and sales growth – is most 
important for our empirical analysis as we want to analyze if successful firms also spawn 
successful ventures. 
3.2.2 Descriptive Statistics: The Venture Dataset 
Our final sample consists of 637 ventures observations and their respective spawning 
companies. Table 2 shows descriptive statistics of this sample.
16
 As before, all financial 
variables are measured in thousands of Euros. 
The results show that the average ROA (V_ROA) of spawned ventures is considerably 
lower than the average OROA (V_OROA). This shows that tax and interest payments account 
for a large share of the ventures’ returns. The average age of the ventures in the sample is 2.5 
years. It can also be seen that most ventures were founded by individual entrepreneurs. Only 
2% were created by founding teams. Furthermore, 26% of the ventures remain in the same 
industry as their parent companies.  
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 It is important to note that all members of the founding team must have been employed prior to the foundation 
of the new ventures if the variable takes the value one.  
15
 Note that for the venture sample we use, based on the 2-digit NACE level, more aggregated regions and 
industries than for the spawner sample because of the smaller sample size.  
16
 All variables starting with a “V” are venture characteristics. The same variables without the “V” account for 
spawning firms’ characteristics.  
 17
If one compares the spawning firms in the venture database with the spawning 
companies of the previous database containing all spawning firms in the Netherlands in our 
period of interest, several differences can be observed. First of all, the spawning companies in 
this dataset, i.e. those that spawn ventures which are subject to corporate taxation, are, on 
average, larger and younger. In terms of performance, the spawning firms’ average ROA and 
average sales growth have decreased.  
 
-----------------insert Table 2 about here----------------- 
4. Econometric Results 
In the following subsections, we present the empirical results for our three research 
questions. We start in section 4.1 by analyzing the effect of, inter alia, firm size and 
performance on the rate at which new ventures are spawned. Section 4.2 in turn is concerned 
with the relationship between spawning firm characteristics (the spawning firms’ performance 
in particular) and venture performance. 
4.1 Which Firm Characteristics Influence the Spawning Rate? 
As mentioned above, we consider the annual number of newly spawned ventures as the 
dependent variable (Spawning Rate). Since this variable only contains positive integers and 
zeros, count data models are applied. Two types of count data models are estimated, namely 
poisson models and negative binomial models. Likelihood ratio tests for the null hypothesis of 
equidispersion show, however, that poisson models are always rejected. As a result, only 
negative binomial models are presented.
17
 Since firms do not spawn new ventures every year 
and since our sample also includes a control group of non-spawning firms, the dependent 
variable consists of many zero counts (74.5%). We account for this by also estimating zero-
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 The poisson estimates revealed the same results as the negative binomial models and are available from the 
authors upon request.  
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inflated negative binomial models. In order to test if the zero-inflated negative binomial 
models outperform the standard negative binomial models, Vuong tests are performed for all 
model specifications. All Vuong test statistics reveal that the zero inflated models fit the data 
better than the standard models.
18
 Nevertheless, we always report both zero-inflated negative 
binomial models and standard negative binomial models. Clustered standard errors are used 
since some of the ventures are observed more often once. 
 The first two columns of Table 3 (Model 1 and 2) provide estimation results for the full 
sample of spawning firms and the control group of non-spawning firms. Both the zero inflated 
negative binomial model and the regular negative binomial model provide similar results. 
First of all, it can be seen that large companies have high spawning rates. It makes sense that 
large firms spawn more given that there are more people and technologies that could spark the 
ideas for new ventures. The positive size effect remains robust if we estimate tobit models 
(Model 6 and 7) in which the dependent variable is the annual number of spawned ventures 
normalized by total assets.
19
 Our first research question formulates a relationship between 
firm size and spawning rates. Based on the described result, it can now be concluded that 
large firms spawn more frequently than smaller firms, providing support for the Xerox view 
as suggested by Gompers et al. (2005).  
The coefficient estimates of the two performance variables (Sales Growth and ROA) in 
Model 1 and 2 are significantly negative. By referring back to our second research question, 
this implies that financially unsuccessful firms spawn more ventures than successful firms (cf. 
Gompers et al., 2005; Eriksson and Kuhn, 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008). One could 
explain this finding by arguing that the opportunity costs for staying at bad performing firms 
are low, leading employees to found their own entrepreneurial ventures.  
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 Vuong test statistics are reported at the bottom of the Table 3.  
19
 We run tobit regressions because the dependent variable does not consist of integer values anymore and is 
truncated at zero. Not only does the firm size coefficient display a similar magnitude and direction as in the 
count data estimations, also the other main results remain comparable.  
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Regarding the control variables, the results reveal that firms have a tendency to spawn 
new ventures when they are young, as indicated by the significantly negative coefficient of 
the Age variable. This result is consistent with studies by Dobrev and Barnett (2002) and 
Gompers et al. (2005). A likely explanation is that young firms are usually characterized by 
higher uncertainty and informational asymmetries (Gompers and Lerner, 2001; Bates, 2005). 
Hence, employees working for such firms might found their own ventures to forestall layoffs. 
Another possible explanation for our finding could be that aging firms are likely to shift their 
strategic focus from product innovations to process innovations. Such a strategic change 
could cause the character of the firms’ knowledge to become embodied in physical rather than 
human capital, making it harder for employees to access the firms’ key knowledge and found 
entrepreneurial ventures (Klepper and Slepper, 2005; Garvin, 1983). 
Another interesting result is that firms paying high average wages also have high 
spawning rates (Average Wage). Since our wage variable is taken as a proxy for the skill 
composition of a firm’s labor force it can be concluded that qualified employees are likely to 
generate more good ideas, which some may decide to exploit without their current employer. 
Finally, year dummies, industry dummies and region dummies are jointly significant 
throughout all two regression models, as Wald tests at the bottom of Table 3 show.  
As many studies on the transition process from employment to self employment focus 
on firms from high tech industries (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2004; Chatterij, 
2009), we re-run our regression models for a subset of firms from high tech sectors (Model 3 
and 4).
20
 This reduces the sample to 11,553 observations. The results are similar to the 
findings for the full sample. Young firms as well as large firms actively engage in 
entrepreneurial spawning. Moreover, successful firms spawn fewer ventures. The only 
difference to the full sample models is that just one performance variable has a significantly 
                                                 
20
 We use the official Eurostat classification to identify high tech industries (Felix, 2006). 
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negative coefficient (ROA). Sales Growth turns insignificant. High tech firms that pay higher 
average wages also have higher spawning rates. 
In a second robustness check we drop the control group of non-spawning firms and 
rerun the regressions for the subsample of spawning firms. All results remain robust. We also 
rerun the regressions for the subsample of 413 firms that spawn taxable ventures. It was 
mentioned before that these firms have spawned the 438 ventures we consider in the next part 
of our empirical analysis. The results are still robust: large and less successful firms have 
higher spawning rates.
21
 As a last robustness check, we estimate probit models for the 
likelihood of being a spawning firm. The results are in line with previous findings and can be 
found in Appendix A. 
 
-----------------insert Table 3 about here----------------- 
4.1.1 Panel Models 
The cross sectional regression results have shown that large firms as well as firms with 
unfavorable sales growth and ROA have higher spawning rates than successful firms. Since 
cross sectional results do not take into account that unobserved firm heterogeneity (due to 
differences in management skills, entrepreneurial climate within the firm etc.) could drive 
spawning rates as well, we also estimate panel models with firm fixed effects. More 
specifically, we estimate fixed effects poisson models as introduced by Hausman et al. (1984). 
Gourieroux et al. (1984) have shown that the poisson estimator is consistent for panel data 
even if the dependent variable does not truly follow a poisson-distribution as long as the mean 
specification is correct. In addition, previous research has shown that a significant portion of 
the overdispersion is accounted for if one allows for random or fixed disturbances (Hausman 
et al., 1984). The fixed effects in our poisson model then control for some of the 
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 The regression results are available from the authors on request. 
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overdispersion in the data. If fully robust standard errors are calculated, the fixed effects 
poisson models even provide protection against any residual overdispersion. Hence, we prefer 
poisson estimators over negative binomial models for our panel data models. Compared to the 
negative binomial panel models, this ensures that no assumption regarding the functional 
form of the variance term is necessary since one would have to cope with inconsistent 
estimates if this assumption fails.  
Model 7 in Table 4 reports the estimates of the fixed effects quasi maximum likelihood 
poisson model for our full sample. As before, large firms have high rates of entrepreneurial 
spawning, which is unsurprising given that more people work there. To this end, we confirm 
this finding by estimating panel tobit models in which the dependent variable is normalized 
by total assets. The results in Model 9 reveal that large firms still have high spawning rates. 
Although the count data results show that spawning is unrelated to sales growth, a highly 
significant and negative effect is found for ROA. Hence, it can be concluded that employees 
do not leave firms that are well performing, but instead when firm performance (in terms of 
ROA) is low. Most employees decide to create their own ventures and pursue entrepreneurial 
opportunities outside the firm when the opportunity costs for remaining employed are 
diminished (also see Gompers et al., 2005; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Erikkson and Kuhn, 
2006). The final result of Model 7 shows that firms paying high average wages also have 
higher spawning levels.  
Running the fixed effects quasi-maximum likelihood poisson regressions (Model 8) as 
well as the tobit models (Model 10) for a subset of high tech firms, reveals the same results. 
The signs and magnitudes of the variables are quite similar and also the significance levels 
have not changed.  
In summary, it can be said that controlling for unobserved firm heterogeneity does not 
change the answers to our two research questions regarding the effect of firm size and 
performance on spawning rates. 
 22
 
-----------------insert Table 4 about here----------------- 
4.2 Providing a Link between Venture Performance and Spawner Characteristics 
The entrepreneurship literature remains quiet when it comes to scrutinizing if the 
performance of spawned ventures is affected by their origin. To shed some light on this 
question, we run OLS regressions with the performance of the spawned ventures as the 
dependent variable (in terms of V_ROA and V_OROA) and venture and spawner 
characteristics as independent variables. Models 11 and 13 in Table 5 only regress the 
dependent variables on venture characteristics. In Model 12 and 14, we add the characteristics 
of the ventures’ former employers.
22
 
The results of Model 12 reveal that venture size has a positive impact on performance. 
Surprisingly, all other venture characteristics are insignificant. Regarding the spawning firms’ 
characteristics, it can be seen that the better the performance of the spawning companies (in 
terms of ROA), the better the performance of the ventures (cf. Franco and Filson, 2006, and 
the references within Klepper, 2009). This result supports our third research question claiming 
that the financial success of the parent firms influences the financial success of the spawned 
ventures. One interpretation of this finding could be that venture founders who worked at such 
firms were able to access and exploit more valuable knowledge, possibly resulting in 
increased venture performance. An alternative explanation is provided by Klepper (2009) and 
Chatterij (2009). They argue that better firms have better employees who are more likely to 
start new ventures, which also perform better. Chatterij (2009) calls this the “good people 
work for good firms” explanation. We try to control for this objection by including average 
wage as a proxy for the skill level of the spawning firms’ employees in our regressions.  
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 Note that we lose some observations for these regressions (Model 12 - Model 14) as we add the sales growth 
of the spawning firms, which costs us one year by definition of the measure. The regression results for Model 11 
– Model 13 are robust if the reduced sample of Model 12 – Model 14 is used. 
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Running the same regressions for our second performance variable (V_OROA) yields similar 
results. Size is the only venture characteristic that has a significant and positive effect on 
performance. Most importantly, however, it can still be shown that ventures of successful 
spawning firms (in terms of ROA) turn out to be successful as well, lending support to our 
third research question.
23
  
Given that successful firms spawn few (as was discussed in the previous subsection) 
but profitable ventures it can be concluded that it employees of such firms are more reluctant 
to quit and create new ventures than employees of struggling companies. Working for a 
successful firm increases the opportunity costs of leaving so that employees only opt for the 
pursuit of entrepreneurial opportunities if the expected returns are high enough. For this 
reason, Erikkson and Kuhn (2006) describe ventures that have been spawned by profitable 
firms to be pulled by the market. This argument is in line with the superior performance of 
ventures spawned by successful firms as was just described.  
 
-----------------insert Table 5 about here----------------- 
5. Conclusion  
The employment history of entrepreneurs has attracted the interest of academic scholars 
in recent years. Several studies argue that entrepreneurs got inspired by business ideas they 
came across at their previous employers (Klepper, 2001; Agarwal et al., 2004; Klepper and 
Sleeper, 2005; Cassiman and Ueda, 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008). This process, by 
which former employees become entrepreneurs and found new ventures, is known as 
entrepreneurial spawning. Previous literature has already identified firm size and performance 
as important characteristics influencing the rate at which new ventures are spawned. The 
question if these spawning firm characteristics can also influence the financial success of new 
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 The result remains robust when we use OROA instead of ROA as a measure for the financial success of the 
spawning firm. Results are available from the authors upon request. 
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ventures, however, remains unanswered by existing studies. This paper provides a first 
empirical investigation of this research gap. In particular, we are interested in the question if 
successful firms spawn financially successful ventures. 
Our analysis is based on the official employee-employer data sets of Statistics 
Netherlands. These data sets allow us to identify all spawning firms along with the newly 
created ventures. Based on this information we investigate three related questions. First, we 
follow previous studies and determine the effect of firm size and performance on the rate at 
which new ventures are spawned. As an answer to our first two research questions, the results 
show that large firms as well as firms lacking a good financial performance are the most 
active spawners. The former finding is in accordance with an earlier study by Gompers et al. 
(2005). Employees seem to create new ventures because they are frustrated that the large 
firms for which they work are unable or unwilling to fund their entrepreneurial ideas. Our 
second finding that there is a negative relationship between firm performance and spawning 
rate is a consistent finding throughout most studies (cf. Erikkson and Kuhn, 2006; Hyytinen 
and Maliranta, 2008; Wagner, 2004). Employees found their own ventures if the performance 
of their employers drop and the rents from staying at the firm are reduced (cf. Erikkson and 
Kuhn, 2006; Hyytinen and Maliranta, 2008; Wagner, 2004). This suggests that most new 
ventures are rather “pushed” by crises at the spawning firms (e.g. bad performances) and not 
“pulled” by the market or the wish to follow a business idea independently (Erikkson and 
Kuhn, 2006).  
The second part of our analysis answers the research question if the financial 
performance of entrepreneurial ventures is affected by the characteristics of their spawning 
companies. Specifically, we are interested in examining the relationship between the ventures’ 
performance and the spawning firms’ performance. We find, in accordance with our research 
question, that firms exhibiting a good performance also spawn successful ventures. A possible 
explanation for this finding is that well performing companies possess valuable and distinct 
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knowledge, which their employees are able to exploit for founding and running successful 
ventures (Klepper, 2009; Agarwal et al., 2004; Franco and Filson, 2006; Erikkson and Kuhn, 
2006). In fact, founders of pulled ventures not only learnt important knowledge about 
technologies (Klepper and Sleeper, 2005; Agarwal et al., 2004), markets (Jovanovic, 1982; 
Agarwal et al., 2004) and organizational processes (Buenstorf, 2009) from their previous 
employers, but also established important contacts with suppliers and customers, which they 
can now take advantage of (Helfat and Lieberman, 2002).  
Finally, our analysis suggests that well performing firms spawn few but successful 
ventures. It seems that employees of such firms are more reluctant to quit and create new 
ventures than employees of struggling companies. In the former case, the opportunity costs of 
leaving are higher so that employees are only deciding to pursue entrepreneurial opportunities 
if the expected returns are high enough. This result is consistent with the superior 
performance of ventures spawned by successful firms as depicted before.  
Our findings have important implications. In particular, they suggest that large firms, 
which have high spawning rates, might want to encourage the internal pursuit of 
entrepreneurial ideas if employees should be persuaded to stay. One way to do so would be 
the creation of corporate ventures (CVs) in which employees’ entrepreneurial ideas are 
implemented. Corporate ventures are autonomous or semi-autonomous firms that reside 
within the organizational domains of their founding companies. An advantage of corporate 
ventures is that they can operate rather independently but still rely on the resources of their 
corporate sponsors (Hill and Rothaermel, 2003; Sharma and Chrisman, 1999). Recent 
research has shown that these specific characteristics make corporate ventures do well at 
generating radically new innovations (Czarnitzki et al., 2010). Cassiman and Ueda (2006) 
argue, however, that firms have a limited capacity for corporate venturing. This means that 
not all entrepreneurial ideas can be capitalized on. Firms have to consider the returns from an 
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employee’s innovation against both cannibalization effects and the option value of waiting for 
better projects in the future. Hence, corporate venturing is only feasible to a certain extent.  
Our study is not free of limitations. First of all, we are not able to measure directly if 
venture founders have learnt something from their previous employers. We can only conclude 
indirectly that employees of better performing firms must have learnt valuable knowledge that 
facilitates the creation of successful ventures. Previous studies could state more specifically if 
employees have inherited knowledge from their previous employers (Agarwal et al., 2004, 
and Franco and Filson, 2006). In fact, both studies were able to distinguish between different 
knowledge types. The reason is that the authors can make use of specific knowledge measures 
that are only applicable to the disk drive industry. Agarwal et al. (2004), for instance, use 
these industry specific knowledge measures to approximate technical knowledge and 
marketing knowledge. Also Chatterij (2009) accounts for technical knowledge in his 
empirical analysis on the medical device industry and confirms the importance of marketing 
knowledge by conducting interviews with venture founders. Such detailed information, 
however, come at a cost as the data samples of these studies are restricted to certain industry. 
While lacking some of the detailed information used in prior research, our study has the 
advantage that it is based on samples that cover the whole Dutch manufacturing and service 
industries. 
Second, our analysis relies on an unbalanced sample of spawned ventures so that we 
cannot use growth measures to further test the robustness of our results. Information on the 
exit dates of the ventures is also missing since our panel is too short to observe many firm 
exits. Accordingly, a survival analysis cannot be performed either. Third, we lack information 
on the innovativeness of the last employers and the spawned ventures. Since we have only 
access to anonymized data sets at Statistics Netherlands and cannot observe firm names, we 
are not able to link publicly available patent records to our ventures and spawning firms.  
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 A possible venue for future research would be to assess if the performance of the 
spawning companies worsens after their entrepreneurial employees leave to found new 
ventures. In this context, it would be interesting to obtain more information on the 
employment history of the spawned employees. What kind of positions did they hold at their 
previous employers? Is venture performance dependent on how long they worked for the 
spawning companies?  
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Appendix A 
Whereas section 4.1 shed light on the effect of, inter alia, firm size and performance on 
a firm’s rate of entrepreneurial spawning, we now analyze the attributes that determine 
whether firms spawn at all. A dummy variable, equaling one if a firm spawns at least one 
venture and zero otherwise (Spawner), was created to address this question.  
 
-----------------insert Table 6 about here----------------- 
 
Overall, the probit regressions in Table 6 largely support the key results from section 
4.1 in the sense that those firms displaying a high spawning rate are also the ones that are 
most likely to spawn at least one entrepreneurial venture. Large firms, young firms and firms 
with an inferior performance have both a high spawning rate and a high likelihood of 
spawning at least one new venture. The results remain robust if one only considers the 
subsample of high tech firms (Model 16). The main difference to the results from section 4.1 
lies in the fact that focused firms (Focused), extremely young firms (Young) and old 
companies (Old) are more likely to spawn new ventures, although these characteristics had no 
impact on spawning rates. 
 
Appendix B 
-----------------insert Table 7 about here----------------- 
-----------------insert Table 8 about here----------------- 
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Tables 
 
Table 1: Descriptive Statistics: Spawner Dataset 
                
 
Spawner 
 (N = 52597)  
Non-Spawner  
(N = 69675)   
Variables Mean SD   Mean 
        
SD 
Mean 
Difference t 
Total Spawning 2.21 11.85  / / / / 
Spawning Rate 0.39 2.26  / / / / 
Size 7.51 1.91  6.29 1.42 1.22 130.00*** 
ROA 0.04 0.19  0.05 0.22 -0.01 -3.81*** 
Sales Growth 0.02 0.35  0.02 0.39 0.00 -0.89 
Age 18.53 11.63  14.75 11.25 3.78 57.26*** 
Young 0.16 0.002  0.27 0.002 -0.11 -46.45*** 
Old 0.03 0.18  0.02 0.14 0.01 16.05*** 
Average Wage 0.49 0.41   0.41 0.37 0.08 38.19*** 
Focused 0.36 0.48  0.21 0.41 0.15 57.77*** 
Note: Industry dummies, year dummies and region dummies are omitted. 
 
 
Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Venture Dataset 
  N=637 
Variables Mean SD Min Max 
V_ROA 0.003 0.22 -1 0.58 
V_OROA 0.04 0.20 -0.93 0.62 
V_Size 5.53 1.42 0.69 9.49 
V_Age 2.58 1.74 0 5 
V_Average Wage 0.32 0.36 0 1.97 
V_Founding Team 0.02 0.14 0 1 
Size 8.79 3.23 1.39 17.43 
ROA 0.01 0.17 -0.29 1 
Sales Growth 
a
 -0.016 0.21 -0.56 0.94 
Age 15.11 10.57 1 37 
Young 0.23 0.42 0 1 
Old 0.022 0.15 0 1 
Average Wage 0.41 0.40 0 1.97 
Focused 0.94 0.23 0 1 
Related 0.26 0.44 0 1 
Note: Industry dummies, year dummies and region dummies are omitted for both ventures and spawners 
a 
Since we lose one year in creating the sales growth variable, we only end up with 426 observations.  
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Table 3: Count Data Results and Tobit Results on the Annual Spawning Rate for the Full Sample and the High Tech Subsample 
  
Dependent Variable: 
Spawning Rate 
Dependent Variable: 
Spawning Rate/Total Assets 
  
ZI Negative 
Binomial 
a
 
Negative 
Binomial 
ZI Negative 
 Binomial 
a
 
Negative 
 Binomial  
Tobit 
 Model 
Tobit  
 Model 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
High Tech 
Sample 
Full 
Sample 
High Tech 
Sample 
Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 Model 5 Model 6 
Size 0.52*** 0.52*** 0.55*** 0.55*** 0.02*** 0.01** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.02) (0.03) (0.06) (0.006) 
ROA -0.43*** -0.43*** -0.46*** -0.54*** -0.03*** -0.02** 
 (0.07) (0.06) (0.12) (0.12) (0.07) (0.09) 
Sales Growth -0.16*** -0.14*** -0.02 -0.01 -0.06*** 0.001 
 (0.04) (0.03) (0.08) (0.08) (0.02) (0.003) 
Age -0.01*** -0.01*** -0.01** -0.01** -0.001** -0.001* 
 (0.001) (0.01) (0.004) (0.004) (0.0001) (0.0001) 
Young -0.05 -0.03 -0.05 -0.08 0.000 -0.004 
 (0.04) (0.04) (0.08) (0.09) (0.02) (0.003) 
Old 0.16 0.19** -0.06 -0.04 0.07 -0.002 
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.38) (0.37) (0.05) (0.01) 
Average Wage 0.91*** 1.13*** 1.11*** 1.12*** 0.06*** 0.03** 
 (0.06) (0.04) (0.07) (0.07) (0.02) (0.01) 
Focused -0.02 0.01 -0.01 -0.003 0.006** 0.003 
 (0.03) (0.03) (0.07) (0.08) (0.02) (0.003) 
Intercept -8.04*** -8.39*** -8.69*** -8.64*** -0.44*** -0.27** 
  (0.13) (0.09) (0.32) (0.34) (0.13) (0.11) 
 Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (4) 
 1055.71*** 1925.29*** 252.71*** 251.31*** 3.61*** 1.78 
 Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (33) 
 388.67*** 434.55*** 18.32** 
b
 17.61** 
b
 0.6 0.69 
b
 
 Joint Significance of Region Dummies, χ2 (11) 
  123.32*** 145.83*** 19.59* 19.16* 1.13 0.44 
Log-Likelihood -41250.03 -41472.61 -3819.47 -3828.25 -8387.29 -127.91 
Vuong Test Statistic 10.39*** / 3.15*** / / / 
Observations 122272 122272 11553 11553 122272 11553 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
a 
The inflation equation includes the same variables as the logit equation (Coefficient estimates are not reported). 
b
 Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (8) 
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Table 4: Panel Models on the Annual Spawning Rate for the Full Sample and the High Tech Subsample 
  
Dependent Variable:  
Spawning Rate 
Dependent Variable:  
Spawning Rate/Total Assets 
  QML Panel Poisson Panel Tobit 
Sample 
Full  
Sample 
High Tech  
Sample 
Full 
 Sample 
High Tech  
Sample 
Variables Model 7 Model 8 Model 9 Model 10 
Size *(1000) 0.34*** 0.41*** 0.02** 5.01*** 
 (0.04) (0.13) (0.01) (0.72) 
ROA *(100) -0.49*** -0.96*** -0.16*** -1.91*** 
 (0.10) (0.23) (0.01) (0.59) 
Sales Growth *(100) 0.03 0.12 -0.14** 0.52 
 (0.04) (0.11) (0.01) (0.37) 
Age *(1000) -0.004 0.004 -0.04*** 0.12 
 (0.005) (0.03) (0.002) (0.12) 
Average Wage *(100) 0.82*** 0.86*** 0.13*** 0.94*** 
 (0.11) (0.27) (0.005) (0.33) 
Intercept *(100) / / -0.31*** -13.9*** 
  / / (0.01) (0.88) 
 Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (4) 
 2146.41*** 217.33*** 2024.81*** 141.17*** 
Log-Likelihood -13638.57 -1115.84 23442.82 322.12 
Observations 33768 2923 33768 2923 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
Coefficients and Standard Errors are only multiplied for the tobit models.  
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Table 5: OLS Results on the Ventures' Performance for the Full Sample  
  Dependent Variable: V_ROA Dependent Variable: V_OROA 
Variables Model 11 Model 12 Model 13 Model 14 
V_Size 0.02** 0.03** 0.02** 0.03*** 
 (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) 
V_Age (*100) 0.02 -0.42 -0.31 -0.83 
 (0.71) (1.33) (0.72) (1.21) 
V_Average Wage (*100)
a
 -0.04 0.01 0.02 0.04 
 (0.03) (0.04) (3.12) (0.04) 
V_Founding Team -0.11* -0.07 -0.07 -0.07 
 (0.05) (0.08) (0.05) (0.07) 
Size (*100) / 0.07 / 0.04 
 / (0.42) / (0.43) 
ROA / 0.19** / 0.16** 
 / (0.09) / (0.08) 
Sales Growth / -0.04 / -0.06 
 / (0.06) / (0.05) 
Age (*100) / 0.03 / 0.005 
 / (0.21) / (0.11) 
Young / 0.02 / 0.02 
 / (0.04) / (0.03) 
Old / -0.04 / 0.04 
 / (0.12) / (0.07) 
Average Wage (*10) / -0.02 / 0.02 
 / (0.45) / (0.39) 
Focused / 0.02 / 0.02 
 / (0.06) / (0.06) 
Same Industry / 0.03 / 0.03 
 / (0.03) / (0.03) 
Intercept -0.11 -0.16 -0.06 -0.12 
  (0.07) (0.12) (0.06) (0.11) 
R
2
 0.04 0.11 0.03 0.12 
Test of Joint Significance of the Venture FoundationYear Dummies, χ2 (5) 1.23 1.45 1.28 1.27 
Test of Joint Significance of the Venture Industry Dummies, χ2 (5) 0.51 0.77 0.51 0.97 
Test of Joint Significance of the Venture Region Dummies, χ2 (3) 0.67 0.26 0.49 0.11 
Test of Joint Significance of the Year Dummies, χ2 (5) / 1.12 / 1.05 
Test of Joint Significance of the Spawner Industry Dummies, χ2 (5) / 1.83 / 1.81 
Test of Joint Significance of the Spawner Region Dummies, χ2 (3) / 1.01 / 1.05 
Observations 637 426 637 426 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
a
 Only the coefficient and standard error of V_Average Wage in Model 12 have been multiplied by 100. 
 37
 
Table 6: Probit Regression Results on being a Spawner for the Full Sample and the High Tech Subsample 
  
Dependent Variable: 
 Spawner (1/0) 
      
Variables Model 15 Model 16 
Size 0.33** 0.38*** 
 (0.005) (0.02) 
ROA -0.18*** -0.26*** 
 (0.03) (0.07) 
Sales Growth -0.19*** -0.16*** 
 (0.01) (0.04) 
Age -0.004*** -0.01** 
 (0.001) (0.003) 
Young -0.19*** -0.19*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Old 0.14*** 0.21** 
 (0.22) (0.08) 
Average Wage 0.79*** 0.71*** 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Focused 0.08*** 0.04 
 (0.02) (0.05) 
Intercept -3.14*** -3.51*** 
  (0.05) (0.47) 
Test of Joint Significance of Year Dummies, χ2 (4) 429.23*** 36.94*** 
Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (33) 535.84*** 17.78** 
b
 
Test of Joint Significance of Region Dummies, χ2 (11) 86.30*** 25.89*** 
Log-Likelihood -71238.73 -6538.89 
Observations 122272 11553 
Notes: Clustered standard errors in parentheses; *** (**, *) indicate a significance level of 1% (5%, 10%).  
b
 Test of Joint Significance of Industry Dummies, χ2 (8) 
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Table 7: Classification of Region Dummies 
Region Description  
1 Groningen 
2 Friesland 
3 Drenthe 
4 Overijssel 
5 Flevoland 
6 Gelderland 
7 Utrecht 
8 North Holland 
9 South Holland 
10 Zeeland 
11 North Brabant 
12 Limburg 
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Table 8: Classification of Industry Dummies 
  
Industry  Description  
1 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco 
2 Manufacture of textiles 
3 Manufacture of wearing apparel; dressing and dyeing of fur 
4 Manufacture of leather and leather products 
5 Manufacture of wood and wood products 
6 Manufacture of pulp, paper and paper products 
7 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media 
8 Manufacture of chemicals and chemical products 
9 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products 
10 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products 
11 Manufacture of basic metals 
12 Manufacture of fabricated metal products, except machinery and equipment 
13 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. 
14 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment 
15 Manufacture of motor vehicles, trailers and semi-trailers 
16 Manufacture of other transport equipment 
17 Manufacture of furniture; manufacturing n.e.c. 
18 Recycling 
19 Electricity, gas and water supply 
20 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; 
 retail sale of automotive fuel 
21 Wholesale trade and commission trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles 
22 Retail trade, except of motor vehicles and motorcycles;  
 repair of personal and household goods 
23 Hotels and restaurants 
24 Land transport; transport via pipelines 
25 Water transport 
26 Air transport 
27 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies 
28 Post and telecommunications 
29 Financial intermediation 
30 Real estate activities 
31 Renting of machinery and equipment without operator and of personal  
 and household goods 
32 Computer and related activities 
33 Research and development 
34 Other business activities 
 
 
